In classical times, a certain General (whom later generations would revere as a philosopher) observed that “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence… supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemies resistance without fighting”.   Centuries later, another General (revered in much the same way) would likely have agreed, though with a slight modification. He would have said hochste exzellenz is to make the enemy “submit to your policies… without firing a shot.” But it was the lesser known Cold War economist-strategist Thomas Schelling who surpassed the generals and gave us concrete examples.

In his 1966 book Arms and Influence, in a chapter entitled “The Art of Commitment”, Schelling described how the 12,000 US Army and Allied troops garrisoned in West Berlin held it against more than 500,000 Soviets in the surrounding Soviet Occupation zone.  And they held it – that is to say, caused Soviet obeyance of US policy — not by force of arms, but by effectively signaling the absolute commitment of the US to its own policy.

The calculus was frigid cold but frightfully clear: the troops were a trip wire.  Nothing more.  Should the Soviets initiate the Second Battle of Berlin, the troops would certainly have been lost and the Soviets would most certainly have won. However, the victory lap would have been very short, as a larger action – one whose outcome would be far less certain – would quickly commence.  After all, the faithfulness of the US, to its allies and especially its own, would demand response.

It has been 55 years since the publication of Arms and Influence.  The Soviet has expired, and the US has since passed through two eras of foreign policy – the “Unipolar Moment” of the 1990s, and the “War on Terror” that commenced after the 9/11 attacks – and found itself in another Great Power Competition.

What “Art of Commitment” must the US foster now?

More precisely, what would persuade China to respect US policies, without causing a war? And what could the US do at the focal point of this competition, the South China Sea?

In their book Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War, Melanie Sisson and her colleagues at the Stimson Center suggest a space within which the solution might be found. Channeling Schelling, they explore 115 empirical cases between 1991-2018 where the US used its military to coerce foreign adversaries into obeyance of its policy (rather than compel obeyance via kinetic means). Their central question was what worked and why did it work? Dr. Sisson and her colleagues concluded that statistically speaking, success is more a matter of convincing adversaries that the US has the will to respond (and less about convincing them that it has the capacity to respond).

Practically, this becomes how to commit ourselves in a way that that the Chinese will know we are committed?  Answer: by putting skin in the game. Just like we did in Berlin.

Just so, Dr. Sisson and her colleagues suggest the presence of US troops could signal to the Chinese the credibility of US intentions.  It could be any troops, but US Marines, deployed from US Navy amphibious warships, would do nicely.  After all, the South China Sea is a body of water, and US Marines are part of the Sea Services.

Imagine US Marines were invited by a concerned nation in need of strong allies – perhaps Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore — to engage in long term exercises on the South CHina Sea islands for which they had legitimate claim.  The Marines arrived and exercised and when they were through, moved onto a new island.  They brought nothing high end, nothing really offensive, just the equipment and kit of US Marines…. (this is not Cuba after all!)

Now then… tension would certainly increase, but new cause for the Chinese to respect the legal boundaries would also emerge.

And why? Because the alternative, escalation, would come at very high price.

Indeed, while the Chinese might well win a single battle – perhaps the Battle for Pulo ng Lawak — a 19-acre islands occupied and administered by the Philippine Government but claimed by China– their victory could never be the end of the affair.  Rather, a larger action would ensue, where US faithfulness, to its allies and to its Marines, would be demonstrated.

But this begs a question.

An amphib needs to be a certain size to effectively support an amphibious assault – I’d guess between 28,000 to 46,000 tons — but how big does it need to be for deterrence?  Answer: big enough to carry what adversaries will view as US commitment.

And in a time of budget pressure, no bigger.

Perhaps aligning with the ideas of Dr. Sisson and her colleagues, the US Navy on 17 June awarded concept design contracts to 5 US Shipyards for what it is calling a Light Amphibious Warship. Known as the LAW, the Navy is looking for a small warship, displacing of no more than 4,000 tons, capable of embarking approximately 75 Marines, to realize Commandant David Berger’s new vision for the Marine Corps: less focus on over-the-beach-invasions and more focus on sea-control.

Just like their Title 10 charter.

However, just like US Army troops in West Berlin, the LAW and the 75 troops they deploy could also be a new tool in the “Art of Commitment.”  A trip wire to be sure, but one just as effective as we had in Berlin, and much cheaper than current alternatives. (Think about it: at 5-8% the displacement of the current amphibs, the LAW will surely be a fraction of the acquisition and operating cost.)

And to those who object to the notion of US Marines being used as a trip wire – and without a doubt, that’s exactly what they would be – well, Amen, I absolutely hear you, and I absolutely acknowledge the seriousness of what is being proposed here.  However, I’d remind you that it is precisely the value that we put on those Sailors and Marines that will make our commitment to the Rules Based International Order in the South China Sea convincing to the Chinese.  And prevent the next world war.

And I think both the Generals-turned-Philosopher and the Economist would agree.

John C. Brenke is the Managing Director of Strat S.P.A. LLC, a consultancy that leverages research and analytics to inform business and organizational strategy.  He is a former Director of Strategy with a leading defense contractor and a native of Ocean Springs, Mississippi.